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Reclaiming resilience back: A local turn in EU external
governance
Elena A. Korosteleva
School of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent, Canterbury, UK
ABSTRACT
Resilience seems to have become “the everyday” covering many aspects of our
lives and the policy agenda of major international institutions. However, despite
the upsurge in its popularity, are we sure we understand resilience well enough
to make full use of its potential? Is resilience just about an entity and its qualities,
the knowledge of which could help us improve its response to adversity? Or is it
more about resilience as governance-thinking which could enable local
communities to self-organize to build life they have reason to value, with
external assistance as necessary? Tackling these fundamentals is important,
not least to ensure that resilience is not another buzzword but an opportunity
to make governance more adaptive. This article argues that resilience cannot
be engineered externally, and requires local communities, aware of their own
strength and capacities, to actualize their own potential in their strife for
“good life,” the way they specify.
KEYWORDS Resilience; external governance; the local; self-governance; capabilities
Over the past few decades resilience seems to have become “the everyday”: It
means “all things to all people” and speaks to every aspect of our daily lives—
from “resilient” economies, cultures, sport, health, family, Brexit, to children’s
TV (“resilient Peter Rabbit” on CBeebies), and even “resilient humanity” in
“Doctor Who,” a popular BBC sci-ﬁ series. It has also pervaded the governance
agenda of major international institutions including theWorld Bank, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), United Nations Development Pro-
gramme (UNDP), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), and the European Union (EU)—all seeking to oﬀer eﬀective solutions
to local problems, and help the vulnerable to become better “prepared and able
to respond to an emergency” (United Kingdom government, 2013). The focus
of their resilience-based policies is equally all-encompassing. It involves issues of
humanitarian aid, development, security, military, defense, diplomacy, food,
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climate, crisis prevention, and capacity-building—covering possibly, every
aspect of state intervention, internal and external, and making “resilience”
one of the most inclusive and popular terms of the day.
However, with this broad appeal, and a recent surge in popularity, are we
sure we understand the concept of resilience well enough, to make full use of
its arresting potential? Is it just about an entity, be it a state, a community or a
person, and its qualities including their “inherent strength” and “capacity”
(European Commission, 2012, p. 5), the knowledge and development of
which could make them more robust and responsive to change? Or is it
also about how we should think today to make governance more adaptive,
and communities—more self-organizing in times of uncertainty and dimin-
ishing control—to enable them to build a life people have reason to value
and strive for? To this end should resilience be always associated with an
emergency, or is it more about a long-term development, shaped by a sense
of “good life” and communal values, and upheld by relevant institutions?
More importantly, can resilience be engineered externally, as the policy
world tends to believe, and if not, how to build resilience in practice?
Curiously, none of these questions would receive a clear or unifying answer
today, not least when deﬁning resilience in governance terms. As a concept, it
is clearly not new, and scholars have done already much work to uncover its
meaning (Kaufmann, 2017; Krause, 2018; Wagner & Anholt, 2016; Walker &
Cooper, 2011), albeit resulting in its further relativization (Bourbeau, 2018),
and as some would even claim, “great derangement” (Ghosh as cited in
Chandler, 2019, p. 4). On the other hand, as regime of governance or a way
of thinking in a policy or practitioner world, resilience is still nascent, but
already fraught with contradictions, given its multiple meanings, and a false
premise that it could be generated externally for target communities.
The use of resilience by the EU is particularly instructive. It was brought to
political prominence by EU institutions (European Commission, 2012) and
especially the oﬃce of the EU High Representative, when articulating the
EU Global Strategy (EUGS) in 2016. Resilience was deﬁned in this document
as “the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recover-
ing from internal and external crises” (European External Action Service,
2016, p. 23). Facing multiple crises in the neighborhood (e.g., Ukraine and
the reversal of the Arab Spring) the EU was searching for more eﬀective
ways to govern and to stay connected to retain a degree of control over a
rapidly changing environment, where “predictable unpredictability” was
becoming a central feature (European External Action Service, 2016, p. 46).
In light of its “constructive ambiguity” (Wagner & Anholt, 2016), resilience
seemed to have “ﬁt the bill” to enable the EU to make its external space
more manageable by shifting the focus (and responsibility) onto “the
outside,” “the local” and a problem at source, hoping that in the long run
“the local agency” would learn to manage itself independently.
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In an age of growing complexity, the timeliness of this thinking could not
be over-estimated: Empowering local communities by placing them in charge
of their own destiny, is a deeply attractive concept, as an opportunity to
extend its outreach, and more crucially, to better connect with “the local”
in order to keep its governance on a sustainable track (Korosteleva, 2018a;
Tocci, 2019). And yet, for various reasons, including perhaps not knowing
how exactly to apply resilience to practice, EU conventional governance-
thinking, through intervention, has prevailed turning resilience into a risk-
management exercise, and “the local,” “the internal” simply into a source of
vulnerability requiring urgent security measures. This “external-internal”
duality of EU resilience-thinking—that is, resolving “internal” problems of
communities (e.g., lack of reserve capacity, dysfunctional institutions, stag-
nant markets) with “external” solutions of the western world, including
framing them in security terms—now risks forfeiting resilience’s arresting
potentiality as self-governance, instead falling into a trap of external engineer-
ing and security maintenance.
These developments, in the EU and the policy world more broadly, have
been mirrored by a scholarly debate. Many saw resilience as an artiﬁcial
concept, to paper over the cracks without oﬀering any real solutions. It has
been regarded as “too ambiguous,” “hardly straightforward” (Rhinard,
2017, p. 5), and even “defensive”- an optimal tool of security governance
for forming “buﬀer zones,” almost as if “when Europe’s neighbors are resilient
to certain threats, those threats will not reach Europe itself” (Biscop, 2017,
p. 3). Others treated it as an extension of neo-liberal governance (Joseph,
2013; Mavelli, 2016) to reconﬁgure its outreach and traction by way of incul-
cating a sense of responsibility and (an illusion of) autonomy through exter-
nally engineered technologies and self-securitizing practices. However,
enmeshing resilience in liberal governmentality (Foucault, 2007) has recently
encountered growing criticism, especially for its externalization of a “problem
at source” and “compartmentalized” thinking, which some argue (Corry,
2014), impedes resilience’s potential. An “alternative” approach to resili-
ence-thinking—the Anthropocene—while fully appreciating its virtues, also
posits some doubts about a possibility of agency to overcome the present
duality of governance (Chandler, 2019). This is because “local problems”
would always be seen as “external” to a policy world and “internal” to local
communities, requiring external intervention, prevention and preparedness,
thus never genuinely grasping the needs of the community seen to require
resilience.
So, is it a dead-end for resilience as we know it, or more precisely, not yet
know it? This article argues otherwise. Resilience does have an arresting
potentiality, provided it is “reclaimed” and “repatriated” back to “the local,”
to belong to “community,” a social system that “feeds upon deviations…
and thrives upon disruptions to its own state of equilibrium [emphasis
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added]” (Luhmann, 1990, p. 180). More crucially, it has to be self-referential,
and “its change will always require working within [emphasis added], not
against [or outwith] the system” (Luhmann, 1990, p. 183). This article, there-
fore, will explore whether resilience-thinking, here understood as self-govern-
ance, is possible and able to work within a set duality of governance—that is,
of external assistance as necessary, to internal problems—to seek its own equi-
librium, from within. Is it achievable to develop an “appropriate balance
between external security guarantees and resources… and the degree to
which the local system has the freedom to develop its own self-organisation”
(De Coning, 2016, p. 175)?
This article will explore these possibilities, by ﬁrst, examining resilience-
thinking in the EU mainstream discourse, to reﬂect on its external-internal
duality and the alleged security-predicated nature. This is an important
analytical exercise to facilitate a shift from understanding resilience as a
quality that may be generated externally, to resilience as an analytic of govern-
ance, that focuses on developing the internal strength and capacities of a
system, and how this thinking could make external governance more adaptive
today.
The article then will turn to a resilience-focused scholarly debate to expose
its often confused and circumscribed thinking about resilience as a western-
laden (neoliberal) concept, which invariably, limits its potential by denying
“the outside,” “the local” their agency to creatively respond to uncertainty
and adapt to the ever-changing world.
The article will, ﬁnally, conclude by introducing a new research agenda to
understanding resilience eﬀectively as an analytic of governance-thinking
using Sen’s capabilities approach (Sen, 1985) along with the actualization of
“self-referential agency” of a complex social system (Luhmann, 1990), to
reclaim resilience by and for “the local.” The added value of this thinking is
not just to bring more clarity to the concept of resilience itself and its practical
operationalization; it is also about how we can ensure that today’s governance
becomes more responsive and adaptable to the challenges of uncertainty,
complexity and diminishing control. After all, as the ﬁnal section argues, if
it is about the local communities determining their own priorities and
futures, as well as resources they may require to achieve that (with external
help as and when necessary), only then resilience would acquire ownership
and purpose; and governance—the needed responsiveness to change and
sustainability.
Resilience as an external tool of EU governance
Resilience has rapidly spread through the policy world driven by the desire to
respond in a more sustainable way to the environment’s growing complexity
and uncertainty. It, for example, became “part and parcel” of the British
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government as early as the 2000s, being deﬁned as a strategy for “better pre-
paredness and ability to respond to an emergency… using local resources and
knowledge” (United Kingdom government, 2013). Soon after, resilience
entered the World Bank’s discourse being framed as “a capacity to mitigate
the impact of disaster-related asset losses on welfare” (World Bank, 2016),
which with the help of external policy interventions was meant “to assess,
predict and minimize the losses to welfare caused by internal or external
crises.” The OSCE (2017) deﬁned resilience as a “capacity to prevent and
recover from hazardous events or shocks,” but also a “capacity to support a
constant transformative action to allow societies to adapt in the face of con-
tinual change” (p. 1). NATO’s understanding of resilience was centered on
“being prepared—that is, having thought, planned and exercised in order to
‘absorb, recover and then adapt to adverse events’” (Lasconjarias, 2017, p. 3).
This snapshot of the use of resilience in a policy world demonstrates that
while it has been seen as internal capacity of an entity to prepare to cope with
adversity, a far greater emphasis is placed on the external intervention to help
“engineer” a more resilient response to problem-solving. This, however,
makes entities dependable on the external provider. As Rhinard (2017)
argues “resilience [would always be] at best, a second-order eﬀect of other pol-
icies” (p. 27). The underlying assumption is that a system can only develop
resilience if it is amenable to external governing, which would assist the
“internal” agency with knowledge and resources to help it recover and trans-
form, to be able to mitigate future risks. This, however, as Rhinard contends,
comes with a disclaimer that “directing policies towards building resilience
may be more wishful thinking than a concrete possibility” (p. 27), simply
because resilience, just as democracy before, may be supported, but not
engineered.
This external-internal framing of resilience has become fully articulated in
the EU oﬃcial discourse in the early 2010s, and has gained a life of its own.
Resilience received its ﬁrst proper elaboration in 2012, in the European Com-
mission’s Communication on The EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from
Food Security Crises. Being the world’s largest humanitarian donor, the EU
saw resilience then as a jointly engineered long-term eﬀort to “support popu-
lations at risk to withstand, cope with and adapt to repeated adverse events
and long-term stress” (European Commission, 2012, p. 2). This eﬀort, accord-
ing to the European Commission, should be systematic and enduring, for only
under these conditions “investing in resilience [would be] cost eﬀective” (p. 3).
In this ﬁrst EU policy document, resilience’s external-internal duality
receives its explicit diﬀerentiation. It was deﬁned as having two dimensions:
“the inherent strength of an entity—an individual, a household, a community
or a larger structure—to better resist stress and shock, and the capacity of this
entity to bounce back rapidly from the impact” (European Commission, 2012,
p. 5). Therefore, to increase “resilience” of an entity meant activating the EU
CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 5
machinery of governance to help the entity develop “internal” critical infra-
structures to reduce the intensity of a variety of impacts. By the same
token, “strengthening resilience lies at the interface of humanitarian and
development assistance” (p. 5), emphatically prioritizing the external side of
governance, without a qualifying reference to the entity itself and its “inherent
characteristics.” Curiously, the same document also insisted that growing resi-
lience should be bottom-up, but not by way of freeing the entity to act as it
sees it ﬁt, but rather by way of embedding external policies and interiorizing
resilience measures into national programs:
Action to strengthen resilience needs to be based on sound methodologies for
risk and vulnerability assessment (European Commission, 2012, p. 12)… [and]
be ﬁrmly embedded in national policy and planning… as part of a sustainable
development process. (p. 2)
The European Commission not only expressed the ambition to support the
development of these methodologies, but also to “put in place a framework
for measuring the impact and results of its support for resilience [emphasis
added]” prepared by “humanitarian and development actors covering
medium to long-term interventions” (European Commission, 2012, p. 12).
Furthermore, the Commission noted that it “will review regularly progress
made on the resilience agenda, looking in particular at programming, meth-
odologies and results” (p. 12). Lastly and importantly, “the EU will promote
resilience in international fora” (p. 12), which shows once more the duality of
the concept.
To sum up, this ﬁrst important iteration of resilience-thinking in the EU
oﬃcial (humanitarian-development) discourse was clearly ridden with ten-
sions. On the one hand, the Commission saw “the local” as a critical beneﬁ-
ciary (and “a keeper”) of resilience articulated through the narratives of
“inherent strength” and internal “capacity” to respond and transform, while
the EU would serve as a mentor, a partner, and facilitator. On the other
hand, the Commission explicitly espoused to deal with a volatile outside, a
problem at source externally, through directive governance and “sound meth-
odologies” of policy solutions prioritizing interventions over “the local” as a
supposedly “self-referential” system for resilience-growth. This meant invest-
ing eﬀort predominantly, in EU assistance to provide, assess, and risk-manage
“the outside,” while ensuring that these resilience-building measures—“readi-
ness, responsiveness and revitalization”—are also duly embedded in national
programs, in anticipation of the future “resilience dividend” (Rodin, 2014).
This “externalization” of resilience—that is fostering resilience by external
means—was ampliﬁed with its entry to the EU security discourse, as part of
the EUGS (European External Action Service, 2016). While deﬁning resilience
as “the ability of states and societies to reform,” the document also under-
scored that “a resilient state is a secure [emphasis added] state, and security
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is key for prosperity and democracy” (European External Action Service,
2016, p. 23). This (security) thinking became more tangible with the European
Commission’s new Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU’s External
Action (2017a), ensuing in profound implications for its meaning and appli-
cation to practice. Indeed, the diﬀerence in the EU’s resilience-thinking of
2012 and that of 2017 cannot be more starkly. Resilience was seen, in 2012,
as a joint endeavor with a target country and a “goal in itself.” In 2017, it
was considered “a means not an end” (European Commission, 2017a,
p. 23), a framework to secure a more governable, and stable outside, especially
at a time of crises and uncertainty. The uptake of this security turn in EU resi-
lience-thinking was to make “the outside” more “predictable” and “manage-
able.” The downside was, however, the denial of agency to “the local,”
associated with a displaced sense of autonomy and a downward spiral to
full governmentalization of “the outside” in modernist terms:
The EU’s strategic approach to resilience is… to achieve long-term… security
goals. It is about securing progress towards these goals by addressing vulner-
abilities and underlying structural risks… [This is because] development,
and progress towards democracy, peace and security, is not a linear process,
and these… on their own, are not always enough to ensure sustainable
results. (European Commission, 2017a, p. 23)
An Action Plan within the same document purports further that:
The primary responsibility of integrating [engineered] resilience into national
and local policy frameworks lies within each country. However, the EU and
its Member States can support strengthening of resilience through raising the
issue as an integral part of its political dialogue, including at the highest
level. (European Commission, 2017a, p. 23)
To sum up, resilience as an EU narrative has now become fully governmen-
talized, prioritizing security of the EU environment, by way of embedding its
external technologies in national programs of target states. To support this,
the EU was also prepared to make “resilience-thinking” political, with some
profound implications for the intended “adaptive strategies” of EU engage-
ment with “the local.” This is further corroborated by EUGS implementation
reports of 2017 and 2018. Notably, the 2017 report (European External Action
Service, p. 14) emphasized a “transformational approach to resilience,”
deﬁning it as a political construct in terms of “protection of human rights,
building political participation, fostering sustainable development and secur-
ity,” exempliﬁed on the case of EU support for Ukraine. The ultimate outcome
of this engagement was to turn resilience into a governing exercise to provide
“better risk-informed analysis and monitoring,” especially for “how external
resilience can impact the EU’s own resilience in areas such as hybrid
threats, cyber security, strategic communication and counter-terrorism”
(European External Action Service, 2017, p. 16). The second report (European
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External Action Service, 2018) went even further to package “resilience” as the
EU’s “integrated approach to conﬂicts and crises,” where:
human security is at the core of all our actions and wherever we can, we engage
at an early stage to prevent conﬂicts and save lives, also in close cooperation
with civil society on the ground. (European External Action Service, 2018, p. 8)
Consequently, instead of helping the EU to decenter and empower “the local”
to tackle their own needs, resilience became an equivalent to institution-build-
ing of what “normal” democracies would require: “professional police, judges,
doctors, administrators, as well as a reliable and controlled army”—economic
development and building capacities for early warning and risk assessment
(European External Action Service, 2018, p. 9).
There is a familiar undertone in all these iterations of resilience—that of
political democracy promotion, risk-management, and security provision
for crises prevention and reduction of vulnerabilities. It was a key feature in
all previous iterations of EU governance (Korosteleva, 2018a) toward the
neighborhood symbolizing a return to “the EU normal” via resilience as gov-
erning regime. A shift to “the local,” through externalization of resilience to
empower local communities and develop responsible agencies, in the EU
language, appear only to mean externalization of EU governing technologies
ensuing in the interiorization of security provision by the target countries.
There is of course nothing wrong with this way of thinking, except that it con-
tinues to deny agency to “the local,” thus negating the very meaning of resi-
lience as a “self-referenced” social system, thriving on its deviations in search
for its own equilibrium (Luhmann, 1990). This no doubt becomes a source of
frustration even for the “modernists,” when resilience transforms into a
“problem of development” outgrowing its neoliberal restraints (Joseph,
2013, p. 45). Equally so, it is an increasing source of desperation for those
who appreciate the potentiality of resilience, and yet see the impossibility of
its governance in the currently ﬁxed settings of separation from “the local”
and “the (disturbing) outside” (Chandler & Reid, 2016; Evans & Reid, 2014;
Grove & Chandler, 2016).
The question is, however, if the nature of governance in EU resilience-
thinking eﬀectively remains the same using conventional technologies of
power transfer—perhaps less intrusive and disciplinary, but still directive,
intervening and without paying much heed to “the local”—then why bring
in “resilience” in the ﬁrst place? Wagner and Anholt (2016, p. 423) aptly
noted that there are other “lingua franca” (such as “sustainable development”)
that have preceded resilience and may still serve the purpose, while the latter is
yet to prove its utility. Do we need new governing “wineskins” (Kelley, 2006)
to cover the same “old” logics of intervention and engineering technologies,
this time driven by security-predicated ideas and a desire for a more stable
outside? Some skeptics would consent to it by observing that often, “the
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redeﬁnition of these categories within the security-development nexus eﬀec-
tively takes them oﬀ the policy agenda at the same time as putting them to
the fore rhetorically” (Chandler, 2007, p. 377). This, however, runs counter
to Tocci’s (2019) overview of the EU resilience discourse and intentions,
and in addition, seems far too complicated to be exploited just as a ﬁg-leaf
measure.
The problem, it seems, is how “resilience-thinking” is being framed, under-
stood and delivered in the modernist policy world riddled with greater
unknowns and a depleting (external) stock of knowledge and technologies
in the face of uncertainty. The question is whether governance can be over-
come to acknowledge a forever less governable outside, and yet support it
in its individuation for the “good life” worth ﬁghting for. The next section
will explore conceptual problems of these parochial understandings of resili-
ence, before suggesting a new research agenda to help reclaim resilience back
for “the local,” and to make full use of its potential as an “analytic of
governance.”
Resilience: Engineered autonomy, impossibility of governance
or else
Heath-Kelly (2016, p. 217) notes that research on resilience in IR seems to
have been stunted by two contrasting dynamics today. One is being signiﬁ-
cantly preoccupied with “recycling the genealogical heritage of resilience” in
an eﬀort to consolidate its multiple episteme (Biermann, Hillmer-Pegram,
Knapp, & Hum, 2016; Bourbeau, 2018; Walker & Cooper, 2011). Although
it is doubtlessly important for our understanding of the nature of resilience
today to enable the best realization of its potentiality, the key concern here,
as Heath-Kelly observes, is its predominantly “retrospective temporality,”
which while useful in thrashing out its many meanings and origin, neverthe-
less is delimiting for grasping its workings today, as its policy applications
have shown.
The other one, with much higher critical mass of engagement (Joseph,
2013; Lundborg & Vaughan-Williams, 2011; Mavelli, 2016), eﬀectively
revolves around “the same debates rehearsed about resilience as a governmen-
talizing agenda” and its critique. There “resilience is explored as an anticipat-
ory mechanism by which a population is managed against an imagined future
danger” (Heath-Kelly, 2016, p. 218). It is essentially conceived in terms of its
“prospective temporality,” which however leaves a “gaping hole” of how to
manage emergencies and complex systems here and now, through resilience.
Once again, the policy limitations of resilience exposed in the previous
section, may be a direct consequence of this “gaping hole” of the present,
which is also starkly exhibited by the governmentalizing (neoliberal)
debates. As Schmidt recalls (2015) resilience-thinking may indeed seem
CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 9
“intuitively neoliberal” in its anticipatory temporality, displaying a range of
similarities with the liberal logics of governance, most notably in the idea-
tional production of autonomy and freedom for “the outside.”
The diﬀerence, as Corry (2014) argues, however, arises when the logics of
resilience and neoliberal governmentality are applied to practice, in their
present temporalities exposing contrasting ways of working with “the
outside” to empower “the local.” Notably, resilience analytic of governing
aims to grow the capacity of local communities as self-referential social
systems, which are operating, possibly with some external assistance,
through internal deviations and disruptions towards achieving their own sus-
tainable equilibrium (Luhmann, 1990), as against the one engineered from
“the outside.” Conversely, the neo-liberal agenda is committed to externaliz-
ing “good governance” of western institutions to local communities, which are
then supposed to embed these solutions in the national programs to make
themselves sustainable (Joseph, 2013). As an analysis of EU governing pat-
terns in the neighborhood have shown (Korosteleva, 2018a; Raik, 2006;
Wolczuk, 2009), this kind of neoliberal analytic more often than not, has cas-
caded the problems down to a source, without necessarily oﬀering any further
solution or adaptation—Ukraine, Nagorno-Karabakh, Belarus are but a few
such examples, discussed by Petrova and Delcour (2019).
Joseph (2013) oﬀered a seemingly convincing argument to suggest that the
logic of Foucauldian liberal governmentality (governance from a distance) sig-
niﬁcantly overlaps with the rationality of resilience, or at least the way it is
exercised and delivered by the international system today. He argued that gov-
ernmentality constructs “neoliberal subjects,” to enable them as “free” citizens
to “take responsibility for their own life choices,” while following the rules of
“conduct” (2013, p. 42). Neoliberal governmentality, in his view, thus oﬀers a
nonintrusive way to “conduct the conduct” by responsibilizing the citizens
(“the local”) externally, to grow their capacity for achieving their social and
economic well-being. He argued that resilience-thinking in many ways,
intends exactly the same (2013): It encourages people through heightened
self-awareness about the world out of bounds and their own reﬂectivity, to
take responsibility for adapting and reforming the system to minimize its
external/internal disruptions.
This may be true in terms of the anticipatory temporality for both govern-
ing analytics, as aiming to reduce vulnerabilities and to improve wellbeing
through the freedom of choice. However, when applied to the present tempor-
ality, the outcome is strikingly diﬀerent for the communities in question, both
locally and globally. While resilience-thinking focuses on “the empowerment
and responsibility of agency at the local societal level, rather than upon the
assertion of the right of external sovereign agency” (Chandler as cited in
Joseph, 2013, p. 44)—this opens up a plethora of local governance domains
in their self-sustaining dynamics and cooperative potential, with profound
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implications for the global. Conversely, neo-liberal governmentality seems
“self-consuming” (Schmidt, 2015), promoting “good governance… decided
by Western interests and transmitted through a normative and normalizing
discourse that transfers responsibility to local agents” (Joseph, 2013, p. 44),
which however, instead of reducing complexity generates insecurity by
making local communities dependable on the external source, and oﬀering
problem-solving measures of only a temporary nature.
The most contrasting diﬀerence between resilience-thinking and a neolib-
eral agenda lies however in the production of freedom. For “the modernists,”
as Chandler (2013, p. 279) refers to them, seeing the world in ﬁxed binaries of
“subject/object,” “inside/outside,” “human/nature,” “known/unknown,” the
notion of autonomy is diﬀerent. Given that “individual freedom is socially
constructed within complex adaptive systems,” Joseph posits, “autonomy
appears as the problem which requires management” (2013, p. 45). This
suggests that, in neoliberal thinking, “it has never been about empowering
an individual, or community in their self-organization” (Korosteleva,
2018b); rather the focus has always been on power (re)production construct-
ing inter-dependencies to render “conduct of the conduct” perpetual in a hier-
archical system of governance (Corry, 2014). This may not be a problem per
se, especially when concerned with sharing “good governance” and “best prac-
tice”; the diﬀerence emerges when it is applied to practice allowing “good gov-
ernance” to interfere with the logics of internal capacity-building, thus
denying agency to local communities.
Another contrasting feature of resilience-thinking to neoliberalism, is its
grasp of complexity, or what Chandler (in Grove, 2017) describes as the diﬀer-
ence between “simple” and “general” complexity. The former associates more
with a neoliberal thought “positing a closed system with emergent, non-linear
properties. It maintains boundaries between the inside of the system and its
outside—and thus retains, in theory, an external position from which the
system can be… known and controlled” (Grove, 2017, p. 185). Conversely,
resilience-thinking reﬂects general complexity, in which governance must
be creative and “limitless,” “to facilitate ‘natural’ life processes rather than
force life to conform to externally-imposed policy agendas” (p. 185). Para-
doxically, neoliberalism demands greater intervention to bring order to
what it conceives to be “a governing normal.” Resilience, as Grove argues,
“transforms ‘the local’ into a site of indeterminate potential, unbounded
from transcendental law of both the state and the market” (2017, p. 186).
“Resilience does not promise protection from harm or evil” (p. 186). It
thrives on a system’s disruptive qualities in search for its own equilibrium.
Interiorized security for resilience-thinking is a misnomer, and its external
engineering is impossibility. What is more, real resilience-thinking dismantles
space as “ﬁxed, bounded and quantiﬁably determined,” which allows “the
global [emphasis added] emerge out of and through localized [emphasis
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added] processes and interactions as much as it is their backdrop or con-
tainer” (Grove & Chandler, 2016, p. 5).
This reveals a real potentiality of resilience as an analytic of governance,
not yet known to the policy world, which is slowly emerging in alternative
scholarship, in the form, for example, of the “Anthropocene” debate refer-
enced by Chandler (2019), and going well beyond political governance
(Grove, 2017; Grove & Chandler, 2016). This kind of resilience is capable
of breaking boundaries and connecting “the global” with “the local,” in an
organic way of initiation, and a creative response, through mobilizing a com-
munal strength and capacity, to treat adversity and crisis as an opportunity to
reform and excel. “The global” in this resilience-thinking can only be con-
ceived through “the local” and its governance domain, deﬁned by its disrup-
tive qualities and struggles for an equilibrium and leading to a new imaginary
of an international system consisting of more bottom-up and responsive
regional orders, which through their resilient thinking are by nature more
cooperative and sustainable in their self-organizing manner.
Is realizing and practicing this kind of resilience possible? The next section
will brieﬂy outline a new understanding for resilience-thinking and research
agenda for further discussion.
Reclaiming resilience back: Capabilities, “good life,” and self-
reﬂection
So, is resilience as self-governance—that is, “where governance is no longer a
matter of intervening” (Chandler, 2014, p. 27)—possible in a policy world of
embedded external-internal duality, faced with the increasing “uncontrollabil-
ity” and the growing complexity of a rapidly changing environment? For
adaptive governance predicated on resilience as self-organization to occur,
it would require a shift from understanding resilience just as a system’s
quality, to its becoming an analytic of governance embracing complexity in
full. This is where it becomes a challenge for implementation.
For a policy world to embrace “self-governance” as resilience-building of
local communities would mean, ﬁrst, a paradigmatic shift beyond instrumen-
tal security-predicated governance operating in a “world amenable to cause-
and-eﬀect understandings of policy-making” (Chandler, 2014, p. 58). As
Bendiek, for example, argues (2017, p. 28), “it is diﬃcult to overlook the
fact that ‘Europe of security’ and the concept of resilience have a tense
relationship.” This is primarily due to how external governance has been
intended to date in a western policy world—to secure the “unstable
outside” using where possible, existing problem-solving technologies of secur-
ity governance, delivered via dissemination of best practice and security
measures to bring “the outside” in line with the international “normal.”1
This ought to change, if resilience-thinking were to be properly applied,
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with a view of allowing the emergence of many diﬀerent governing domains,
and also the need to bring them to a “shared normal” under a renewed global
governance architecture. This thinking clearly challenges the foundations of
International Relations as a discipline for how “the global” should be under-
stood and studied today.
Second, and relatedly, embracing full-ﬂedged resilience would also entail
rejecting some tenets of today’s EU resilience-thinking strategy—most
notably, the idea of engineering and managing resilience outside-in, by way
of oﬀering external solutions to internal problems for communities, turning
them into dependable subjectivities and consumers of the western modes of
“good governance,” as neoliberal thinking would suggest. Resilience-thinking
has to oﬀer a diﬀerent kind of governing analytic, to start with the commu-
nities, and work their way “inside-out” when seeking assistance and advice
as necessary, thus building up “the global” through “the local” and this
way, making “the global” system far more connected, responsive and agile
to the needs of the local communities.
Despite the limitations of the current policy and scholarly debates, there is
a silver-lining for possible improvement in the use of resilience-thinking as a
new (EU) governing regime. Notably, the EU in contrast to its cumbersome
architecture, is surprisingly agile and reﬂective about its engagement with
“the outside,” which perhaps led it to conceiving of resilience as a new govern-
ing strategy after a series of less successful attempts to develop traction in the
wider neighborhood (Schumacher, Marchetti, & Demmelhuber, 2018). Fur-
thermore, the EU seems to have an intuitive understanding of the important
role of communities, as opposed to that of the state and society, for resilience-
building. This was attested to by the 2017 Resilience Strategy (European Com-
mission, 2017a) which explicitly diﬀerentiated “community” from any other
agency to underline the relevance of local ownership (and just the embedded-
ness of policies in national programs) for achieving the “good life.” What
needs to happen next is to develop an understanding of how to enable com-
munal resilience-building, along with a joined-up thinking across diﬀerent
policies, institutions and governing spaces, to ensure that as an analytic of
governance, resilience is no longer dependable on external interventions,
and instead can draw on them as necessary, when initiating change.
This thinking is supported by a critical turn in EU resilience governance
studies—a turn to “the local,” brieﬂy outlined in the introduction.2 This
type of governance infers working through, or more pertinently, with commu-
nities: Through recognizing the capacities and capabilities that already exist
and could be encouraged. It is about an ontological understanding of our
natural abilities to cooperate with each other and construct communities of
shared interest, through constantly striving for the “common good.” In this
sense, governance based on resilience, needs to be reframed in order to
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recognize the creative and self-ordering power of life itself, as expressed by the
Anthropocene (Chandler, 2019).
Without delving too much into detail, the Anthropocene has the advantage
of breaking silos and external-internal boundaries in delivering governance
for human empowerment. The Anthropocene imaginary “forces humans to
confront the limits of knowledge” and promises “new ways of being and
knowing without separations and cuts dependent on linear spatial and tem-
poral conceptions of the world” (Grove & Chandler, 2016, p. 6). Governing
in the Anthropocene “never starts a process with goals or aims at transform-
ation, and instead is reactive and responsive rather than a matter of initiation”
(Grove & Chandler, 2016, p. 7) orchestrated externally. Yet, the Anthropo-
cene comes with its caveats. One relates to its path-dependent reactive tem-
porality of thinking when responding to the challenges without setting the
goals for development. Being in a reactive and perhaps more agile mode is
one matter; but striving to make choices for the betterment of community
is another, and it is this purposefulness, including planning, of collective
living, that seems to be missing from the current Anthropocene-thinking.
The second challenge is how to get there, when contextualizing resilience in
each given case, without knowing “the knowns” or “the unknowns”; and
when the boundaries of knowledge are no longer a blockage.
How can we help communities to empower themselves in the face of adver-
sity, unpredictability and complexity, without turning assistance into inter-
vention? If the outside-in governance approach hitherto yielded only
limited results, how can an inside-out resilience-building work better and
become more sustainable as alternative analytic of governing?
Developing capabilities, as Sen (1985; see also Nussbaum, 2013) for
example argues, could be a certain way forward. What determines communal
well-being then is not so much the provision of utilities (or institutional infra-
structures), nor that of primary goods that would drive the levels of welfare
up. Instead, it should be about developing “the capabilities to choose a life
one has reason to value” (Sen as cited in Stewart & Deveulin, 2002, p. 61).
Based on Aristotle’s thinking, Sen argued that development was about provid-
ing conditions to facilitate people’s ability to lead ﬂourishing lives. These con-
ditions he deﬁned as capabilities—as the ability to choose “what people may
choose to be, or do,” over their functionings—that is, “what people actually are
or do” (Stewart & Deveulin, 2002, p. 62). This process requires reﬂection,
learning and public discussion “that need to be solved within the society
aﬀected and not by outsiders” (Stewart & Deveulin, 2002, p. 64). At the
heart of this process is the aspiration for “the common good”: “The
common good is the good human life of the multitude of persons; it is their
communion in good life; it is therefore common to the whole and to the
parts, on which it ﬂows back and who must all beneﬁt from it” (Maritain
as cited in Deneulin, 2006, p. 55).
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Each community would have an inner sense of what is invariably
good for them as a collective, to be underpinned by respective primary insti-
tutions and governance structures in search for congruence between values
and tradition, on the one hand, and achieving the ideational “Signiﬁcant
We” (Flockhart, 2006), on the other. Many communities have tacit words
to depict this sense of communal becoming—Arabic term “al-harak,” refer-
ring, as Sadiki argues (2016, p. 338) to the “peoplehood” to encapsulate their
vision for a better life, agaciro in African (Rutazibwa, 2014), “hygge” in
Danish, tutyashya in Belarusian, or mahalla in Kazakh. It implies, as Ruta-
zibwa argues, people’s “understanding that [they] are the agents of [their]
own change” (2014, p. 5), a particular philosophy of life that draws on
self-reliance and the inner knowledge of the people of what they are, and
what they want to be, and could serve as a premise for resilience governance
thinking.
Growing capabilities—that is, developing an understanding of choice, a
sense of identity and purposefulness of “good life”—does not come naturally
in the world of resilience. It cannot be engineered from outside or inculcated
as an expectation of conduct as neo-liberal governance may suggest. It has to
come through experience, trial, and even failure, this is where the EU once
again seems to have some intuitive understanding of the process but fails to
put it to practice.
The EU programming of capacity-development measures as part of a rela-
tively new European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) for the Eastern Part-
nership countries, under a single support framework, serves as a testimony to
its delimiting creativity, captured by neoliberal practices. In particular, the EU
when planning resilience support for the neighbors, seems to go by the book
when identifying “strategic objectives,” “sectors for intervention” and
“ﬁnancial instruments,” speciﬁc for each partner-country—all set with refer-
ence to a generic frame of programmatic interventions. And yet, the same ENI
suddenly comes to oﬀer new tools of assistance—a complementary support “in
favour of civil society” and “for capacity development and institution-build-
ing.” The elements of surprise here include ﬁrst, that these are additional
measures to the priority commitments derived from and ﬁxed by the EU
agreements and sector interventions; and second, they aim to “cover” and
to deal with “emergent challenges including, but not limited to, those
covered under priority sectors” (European Commission, 2017b; see also Euro-
pean Commission, 2013). These two measures seem to speak the language of
resilience proper, and imply an opportunity for the local communities to go
creative about tackling their respective problems, and act in accordance
with the resilient analytic of governance—that is, to be their own agents of
choice in accordance with their needs and vision. This innovation in the
ENI programming however is relatively new, and is conceived by the Euro-
pean Commission (2017b, 2013) as “complementary,” meaning that in
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terms of the budget it would receive no more than 5% of ﬁnancial support;
while leaving the remaining 95% for the pre-set planning and target manage-
ment. At the same time, while meager, it still points in the right direction—of
enabling communities to adapt to emergent challenges and seek their own
eﬃcient ways to respond to them, inside-out, while developing a better
grasp of their own potential.
This inherent understanding cannot come without self-reﬂection as to
what we are as a community, and self-reference. The latter is particularly
important to operationalizing resilience-thinking. As Luhmann notes
(1990): “the unity of the system is the self-reference of the system, and its
change will always require operating within, not against, ‘the system’”
(p. 183). This self-referential system can absorb planning (and assistance)
despite its naturally disruptive qualities (p. 180); the focus of these systems
is not “on control but autonomy, not on static but dynamic stability, not
on planning but evolution” (p. 187). Hence the importance of working with
communities “inside-out” rather than from the external perspective, in engen-
dering their adaptation to and working around a problem at source, with
some external assistance as necessary.
This is where EU resilience-thinking as initially conceived by the EUGS
and concretized by the EU strategic approach to resilience (European Com-
mission, 2017a) has so much arresting potentiality: aiming to empower the
local communities, enable them to grow their strength and capacity to
achieve a sense of the “good life” while the EU would walk along as a
mentor and a partner to act as necessary. However, adopting resilience as ana-
lytic of governance requires change in how the EU and other international
institutions would come to practise it. Can we rely on the everyday, the
local and the peoplehood, to “own” their challenges, and more importantly,
to know how to overcome them, in becoming what they want to be and so
to protect their agaciro, hygge, or al-harak?
This is still an open-ended question. Intuitively, as Chandler points out
(2015, p. 38), resilience governance presumes a process of “construction or
recognition of ‘negotiated moral communities’ capable of self-organizing in
relation to the shared world.” At the same time, how are we to assist with sup-
porting these “negotiated moral communities,” especially in a developing
world, when it is exposed to daily hardship and dictators’ brutality, perpetual
corruption and withering hopes for the “good life”? How do we exercise the
kind of resilience as a non-intervening analytic of governance to avoid the
entrapments of compliance and dependency?
Kaufmann (2013, 2017) suggests placing more emphasis on the study of
self-organization, as part of the wider network system of governance. This
kind of governance might be best described as “guided self-organization,”
which relies on a networked system of shared interests and rules, where
change starts with the local, while “the global” renders it its support and
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then changes itself through a continuing process of adaptation and reﬂectivity.
In this context, the resilience of the peoplehood, as Chandler (2014) argues,
“removes the external intervener from external intervention and with this
makes local capacities, practices, and understandings the means and the
ends of intervention” (p. 48). This, however, requires an enduring process
of change and adaptation, and we seem to be only at the very beginning of
responding to it.
Conclusion
Owing to its growing popularity as well as policy and scholarly confusion, this
article has insisted on examining resilience, not as a quality of a system, or a
policy tool introduced by the EUGS in 2016, but rather, more broadly, as a
new analytic of governance. To better understand resilience and fully utilize
its potential, which deﬁnitions and practices are far from unifying today, it
is important to view it as a process of self-referential capacity-development
premised on a community’s sense of “good life” and articulated through the
mechanisms of self-governance. While this meaning is intuitive, there are
no yet easy ways of putting resilience to practice, and this article has
exposed tensions and misperceptions of resilience both in the policy and scho-
larly worlds.
While policy-makers, especially in the EU, have been keen to adopt resili-
ence-thinking as a “turn to the local,” by shifting the focus and responsibility
onto external communities, and acting as “mentors” and “partners” along the
way, its implementation and practice have already caused much controversy.
In particular, the same tried-and-tested governing technologies prioritizing
external intervention over developing resilience inside-out, tend to prevail.
Furthermore, given the increasing unpredictability of the outside and a
strong desire of major donors to stay in control of their governing practices
in an anticipation of results, resilience-thinking has become enmeshed in
security priorities of the donors, rather than “the local needs” of the recipients.
Equally, scholars ﬁnd themselves in a similar state of confusion, often
seeing resilience either as papering over the cracks, or simply as an extension
of neo-liberal governmentality, which either way tend to deny agency to “the
local.” An emergent critical thinking, as part of the Anthropocene, challenges
these “modernist technologies,” and yet, it struggles to reconcile the potenti-
ality of resilience with the persistent external-internal duality of the estab-
lished governing mentality and architecture.
To prevent resilience from losing its arresting potential, this article insisted
on ﬁrst, understanding resilience as a long-term self-organizing process of
capability-development rather than just a system’s quality(ies) needed for sur-
vival. Second, as self-referential governance, resilience cannot be engineered
externally, and can only be internally nurtured with external assistance as
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and when necessary, drawing on existing resources, and a sense of “good
life”—hence, it is crucial to locate resilience with and for “the local.”
Finally, reclaiming resilience back by “the local” as a self-organizing and
self-referential system, as an organizing principle belonging to communities
(not states or donors), is an important and critical step forward for changing
our thinking about how we can better govern today and respond to change.
Developing best practices for this (new) type of adaptive governance is,
however, going to be a challenge, owing to the current delimiting and often
circumscribing thinking by both the policy and scholarly worlds. They
often ﬁnd themselves, as the article showed, being trapped in thinking
“global” at the expense of and the disconnect with “the local,” under the illu-
sion of “taking control” where none is possible.
For global governance to become more responsive to change, it is critical
that “local communities” should be in charge of actualizing their inherent
strength and turning their capacities into capabilities to make social
systems at all levels more sustainable, and a life worth living for. How to do
it through resilience is, however, an enduring but exciting pursuit.
Notes
1. For more discussion see Tocci’s points (2019) on securitization of resilience.
2. See Korosteleva and Flockhart (in press).
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